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TEACHING THE NEW THREE
Rs-REPRESSION, RIGHTS, AND
RESPECT: A PRIMER OF STUDENT
SPEECH ACTIVITIESt
S. ELIZABETH WILBORN*
We don't need no education
We don't need no thought control
No dark sarcasm in the classroom
Teacher leave those kids alone . . . .
—Pink Floyd, "Another Brick in the Wall (Part H) "'
Although one might question Pink Floyd's particular articula-
tion, the lyrics capture the problem of self-expression in the primary
and secondary school setting. Students can legitimately complain that
many primary and secondary schools unnecessarily subject them to
enforced orthodoxy and repressive strictures. For example, school
authorities have disciplined students for protesting the hiring of re-
placement teachers during a strike,' for selecting potentially controver-
sial (although relevant) school plays and films,' and for wearing T-shirts
with relatively innocuous political statements. 4 Moreover, school of-
t Copyright © 1995, S. Elizabeth Wilborn.
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.,; J.D. Duke University 1991. 1 am grateful
fur the invaluable assistance provided by Professor Ronald Krotoszynski. 1 would also like to
acknowledge the contributions of Professor Thomas Rowe, Professor William Van Alstyne, and
Kenneth P. Cohen.
1 PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THIS WALL (Pink Floyd Music Ltd., 1979).
2
 Chandler y. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 526 (9111 Cir. 1992) (prohibiting students
from wearing buttons with the word "scab" to school); see Boyd v. Board of Directors, 612 F. Supp.
86 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Dodd v, Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
3 See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (school production of "Pippin" discon-
tinued after members of school board objected to play's sexual content); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ.,
630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986) (school hoard prohibited high school drama production of the
play "Runaways" due to its themes of drug abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, child abuse and rape);
see also Fowler v. Board of Educ„ 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.) (school dismissed teacher for "conduct
unbecoming a teacher" after she showed a high school English class Pink Floyd film, "The Wall"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987).
4
 See Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992) (upholding school authorities
one-day suspension of student who wore "Drugs Suck" T-shirt to school, reasoning that regardless
of whether "sucks" connotes a sexual meaning, its use is offensive and vulgar to many people);
rf, Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971);
Freedman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971).
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ficials have routinely censored school newspapers,' removed library
books,' and engaged in ideologically based curriculum selection.? They
have even dictated a student's attire at the senior prom.' Surprisingly,
the federal courts have sustained these actions in most instances, and
when doing so have accorded little or no weight to students' interest
in free expression. These and similar decisions reflect a misguided
attempt to provide school administrators with unfettered discretion to
implement their educational programs at the cost of student speech
rights.
In fact, the federal courts have not considered students' speech
interests in a fashion consistent with the protection provided other
student rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination. 9
Nor do the decisions reflect anything vaguely approaching the level of
protection for speech rights that adults enjoy.'° Under existing law,
core political speech is no more protected in the public schools than
a dirty limerick scrawled in a bathroom stall. The lower courts' behav-
ior can best be understood as a reflection of and reaction to a number
of factors, including the compulsive nature of attendance at primary
and secondary schools, the fact that students in a classroom are a
captive audience, the maturity level of the students, the schools' duty
5 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U,S. 260 (1988); Nicholson v. Board of
Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Gambino v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.
Va.), affd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Pliscou v. Holtville Unified Sch. Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842
(S.D. Cal. 1976).
6 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v, Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
Sch. Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Shed( v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Stipp.
679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 E Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Zykan v. Warsaw
Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (school board prohibited a high school
English teacher from using three books in her course "Women in Literature": Frank Shiras's Go
Ask Alice, Sylvia Plath's The Bell far, and Ira Levin's The Stepford Wives); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding school board removal of Kurt Vonnegut's
Cat's Cradle and God Bless Yau, Mr, Rosewater and Joseph Heller's Catch-22 from the curriculum
after a committee read the books and, contrary to faculty recommendations, determined they
were "garbage").
Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (upholding the
removal from the high school prom of two students dressed in clothing of the opposite sex,
reasoning that the action was reasonably related to the legitimate educational purposes of
teaching community values and maintaining discipline). But see Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381
(D.R.I. 1980) (reversing school board refusal to allow same-sex couple to attend senior prom).
9 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (overturning conviction of defendant for
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft," stating that criminal prosecution for the
public display of an expletive was a violation of the defendant's First Amendment rights). But cf.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding student's suspension for use
of sexual innuendo in campaign nominating speech at school assembly).
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to provide a safe environment conducive to learning, and the educa-
tional goal of inculcating the social, moral, and political values of
society.
Many commentators have argued that the exchange of ideas
within the context of secondary education is essential to foster precol-
lege students' future civic competence." Schools serve as "the cradle
of our democracy,"12 and student expression plays a fundamental role
in the growth of students' knowledge, intellect, and capacity for ra-
tional deliberation.' 3
 Student expression that diverges from or contra-
dicts the school's curricular message, but does not interfere with or
disrupt the school's work contributes to learning." Thus, a conflict
potentially exists between a school's authority to inculcate knowledge
and values that it deems important and the speech interests of individ-
ual students.i 5
II See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMnLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS Swint' 129-30
(1960) (arguing that the road to genius requires an educational process that permits experimen-
tation and creativity); Stanley Ingber, The. Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
14 1, 25-31 (arguing for development of "personal autonomy" during precollege education);
Robert B. Reiter, Judicial Review of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the Legitimacy
-Com-
petency Debate, 50 Mo. L. REV. 25, 47-55 (1985) (advocating multidimensional model that encom-
passes both marketplace and inculcative approaches to education). In addition, a more demo-
cratic family or school is thought to predispose minors to democratic rallies. Roaliwr D. HESS &
JUDITH V. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLtTICAL NEFITUDES IN CHILDREN 93-115 (1967); see
also RICHARD E. DAWSON & KENNETH PEurrr, PotrricAt SOCIALIZATION 165-66 (1969) (empha-
sizing that the most important aspect of political socialization is the atmosphere of the classroom).
But see Richard M. Merehnan, Democratic Politics and the Culture of American. Education, 74 AM.
POL. SCL REV. 319 (1980) (discussing weaknesses in schools' socialization of democratic values).
12
 James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1972).
13 See John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tmtx. L. REv. 321, 326-27 (1979)
(arguing that educational practices that prevent children front attaining the knowledge and
intellectual skills necessary for effective exercise of (heir First Amendment,rights abridge their
rights); see also R. George Wright, Free Speech Values, Public. Schools, and the Role of Judicial
Deference, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 59, 61 (1987) (arguing that a public school student has "a presently
enforceable free speech right prohibiting restrictions imposed by the school in such a way as to
significantly impair, inhibit, or otherwise 'stunt' the development of the student's future free
speech-relevant capacities").
" See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06, 514 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional the school's prohibition of students' wearing of armbands in protest
of Vietnam War).
15 See William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 lowA L.
REV, 505, 505-06 & n.2 (1989); see also Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the Pall qf
Orthodoxy: Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. I,.,.. L. REV. 15, 15-20 ("First Amendment
paradox" of public education that must socialize children in society's norms while promoting
children's autonomy to modify or abandon those norms); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth firr
Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J.
1647, 1649 (1986) ("Socialization to values through a unithrm educational experience necessarily
conflicts with freedom of choice and the diversity of a pluralistic society.").
122	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:119
Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment provides only limited protection to student speech. Un-
der a standard first developed by the Court in Bethel School District No.
403 v. Frasert 6
 and later refilled in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier,r7 school authorities have broad discretion to restrict student
speech that ostensibly interferes with the school's intended curricu-
lum. In short, when school-sponsored speech is involved, government
need act with only minimal rationality.' 8 Indeed, under the current
standard applicable to student speech, a commercial for Hostess
Twinkies receives greater protection under the First Amendment than
does a student's political speech. 19
Under the Supreme Court's Fraser/ Hazelwood test, which is essen-
tially a rational basis test, student expression receives little protection
and still less respect. The federal courts have largely discounted the
value of student speech in order to provide school boards with broad
discretionary authority to control and discipline students. For unclear
reasons, the federal courts have not crafted an analytical model that
provides significant protection to student speech without interfering
with the school administrator's ability to achieve the institution's edu-
cational objectives.
This article acknowledges the importance of good order and dis-
cipline in primary and secondary schools, but argues that the Court's
current jurisprudence significantly undervalues student speech. This
article advocates an approach that would require courts to consider
not only the special context in which student speech occurs, but also
the content of the speech. The proposition that student speech activity
should be protected based on its content seems to cut against the grain
of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this
article argues that it is the best and most effective means by which to
protect student expression.
16 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
17 454 U.S. 260, 270, 273 (1988).
18 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); see also Fraser, 478 U.S.
at 685-86 (holding that school authorities acted within their discretion to protect school's
educational mission by sanctioning lewd student speech in a school assembly).
IS Compare Central Hudson Gas Sc Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (holding that truthful commercial speech may he regulated only if the government
interest is substantial, the regulation directly advances the government interest and the regulation
is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest) with, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d
757, 763 (Rh Cir. 1989) (upholding under rational basis test the discipline of a high school
student. who campaigned on the platform of breaking the "iron grip" the school administrators
had on the exercise of student rights), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
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Part I of this article discusses the development of student speech
rights and the current approach used to evaluate such claims. Part 11
argues that this approach is poorly suited to the special problems
inherent in student speech controversies. By accommodating only con-
siderations that arise from the forum in which student speech activities
occur and not the nature of the student speech at issue, the courts
have adjusted only one side of the equation. They are using a rigged
scale, creating a severe imbalance when they engage in interest balanc-
ing. Finally, part III suggests a revised approach to establishing the
proper balance between students' speech rights and the school's inter-
est in its curriculum. This part presents an alternative analytical frame-
work, a framework that satisfies the Supreme Court's concern for the
school's role, but provides greater protection for student expression. 2 "
In this article, I argue that the current rational basis test fails
to provide any meaningful protection to student speech. Under the
Fraser/ Hazelwood rational basis standard, a student's free speech inter-
ests are either minimized or completely ignored. 21
 Furthermore, the
Fraser/Hazelwood rational basis test makes no distinction among classes
of student speech. I argue that the Supreme Court should adopt a
content-specific First Amendment analysis to test the validity of school
authorities' restrictions on student expression. Recognizing that pri-
mary and secondary schools fulfill an important function in our society
that justifies the imposition of some special burdens on student expres-
sion," I do not advocate a great broadening of the constitutional rights
of students (i.e., they should not be coextensive with the speech rights
enjoyed by adults). A more refined balancing approach, however, will
provide greater protection to student expression and require reviewing
" The content-specific approach that I advocate would require courts to consider not only
the special context in which student speech occurs but also the content of the speech. In analyzing
any student expression claim under a content-specific test, the court would first determine
whether the speech involved is political, scholastic, or indecent. This characterization is similar
to the characterization the courts make when determining the level of protection accorded to
particular kinds of adult speech. After determining the appropriate speech category, the court
would then apply a corresponding level of scrutiny appropriate to the speech. Such an approach
would provide greater respect for student expression by protecting it from the arbitrary whims
of school officials.
21 See Poling, 872 F,2d at 762-64; Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Stipp. 1526, 1534-37 (E,D,
Va. 1992).
22
 For example, students are often required to write papers on controversial subjects and are
asked to argue in favor of a viewpoint that they do not share. Also, the subject matter of speech
in the classroom is closely regulated, and rightly so: not only may a student be forbidden to discuss
history in algebra class, but she also may be Ibrbidden even from discussing last week's homework
assignment during the current week's session.
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courts to give serious consideration to the necessity of school authori-
ties' repression of student speech activities.
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Courts and academics have long recognized that schools differ
from other environments because of the particular educational mis-
sion society entrusts to them. 23 We expect our primary and secondary
public schools to select and implement a curriculum that will educate
students and make them responsible citizens. 24 To fulfill this role, the
schools must inculcate fundamental community values. 25 The commu-
25 As Chief Justice Warren stated;
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
14 Courts agree that one of the most important functions of schools is to impart school-de-
termined and school-endorsed knowledge, skills, and values to students. See, e.g, Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) ("[S]chool boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply
their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,' and ... 'there is a legitimate
and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be
they social, moral, or political.'" (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10)); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (schools' functions include "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) ("[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of the school officials ... to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools."); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("[Education] is the very foundation of good
citizenship.").
25
 "Inculcation" describes the schools' authority to select and implement their curriculum by
"provid [Mg] educational experiences that give pupils an understanding of the values, mores and
traditions of society, and that will ensure adherence to these values in behavior." Brian A.
Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom:
A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. I, 2 n.1 (1984) (quotingJ. SAYLOR & W.
ALEXANDER, CURRICULUM PLANNING FOR MODERN SCHOOLS 127 (1966)); see also Stephen R.
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Mach,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350 (1976) [hereinafter Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right]
("historically accepted societal view [is] that the deliberate inculcation of the right societal values
is a major function of American public education"); Stephen R. Goldstein, Reflections on Devel-
oping Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. RENT. 612, 614 (1970) (traditional view of
secondary education is the incuicative or "the prescriptive model, [in which] information and
accepted truths arc furnished to a theoretically passive, absorbent student. The teacher's role is
to convey these truths rather than to create new wisdom."); Malcolm Stewart, The First Amend-
ment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J.L. & Eouc. 23, 23-29 (1989)
(education inevitably iriculcative, as it disposes students to accept some values and opinions and
reject others; therelOre, school authorities should have broad powers to structure educational
programs, with view towards inculcating comtnunity values).
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nity grants primary and secondary schools broad discretion in the
hope that attainment of these goals will prepare students to participate
fully and responsibly as adults in American society. Under the inculca-
tion theory, the school does not exist to facilitate student speech rights,
but rather to fulfill its educational mission.
Our schools, however, must do more than teach young people
about mathematics, the sciences, history, and English; they must also
convey important information about the values of democracy, includ-
ing the idea that we do not always agree about important questions of
the day. Exposure to a variety of ideas and values is essential to nurtur-
ing the participation of young people in a truly democratic, pluralistic
society. Learning to evaluate conflicting positions on the basis of their
own developing knowledge, experience, and judgment is an important
skill, one that must be mastered through the trial and error of experi-
ence.28
II. A PRIMER ON STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech."21 In almost every context outside
a primary or secondary school, the First Amendment protects an
individual's speech activities from government interference unless they
fall within one of several narrowly defined categories such as obscen-
ity,28 advocacy of imminent lawless behavior, 29 defamation, 88 or fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. 81 When speech does not fall into one of these
unprotected categories, government must justify any regulatory bur-
den that it imposes on the speech activity with a correspondingly
26 The notion of the school as a place for the exchange of a variety of opinions has a number
of supporters. See lngber, supra note 15, at 25. The courts, though, have been willing to apply
the concept of the marketplace of ideas to student expression only in the context of postsecon-
dary education. See Bender v. Williamsport. Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 547-49 (3d Cir. 1984)
(although colleges may be marketplaces of ideas and hence open forums for their students, high
school expression is more circumscribed), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (lack of
standing); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right, supra note 25, at 1341-43 (marketplace-
td-ideas paradigm generally pertains to higher education, while value inculcation has traditionally
been viewed as the role of precollege education).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
299
	 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that state may not punish
threatening speech unless the speech is directed to incite imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite such action); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that government
may not punish private citizens' distribution of anti-draft leaflets unless the speech poses a clear
and present danger of interference with the workings of government).
See. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that actual malice
must be shown before press rights may be restricted as to public figures in defiunation actions),
81 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-414 (1980),
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important public interest, which varies with the exact content and
nature of the speech. For example, the courts have provided substan-
tial protection to political speech,32
 while providing a lesser degree of
protection to commercial speech." By applying differing standards
of review to different classes of speech, the federal courts have effec-
tively policed unreasonable governmental regulations on speech activ-
ity, thereby promoting the values that the First Amendment ostensibly
safeguards." Unfortunately, the courts have failed to apply this analyti-
cal framework to student speech, treating all types of student speech
without differentiation for First Amendment purposes. This has led to
a substantial erosion in the First Amendment protection afforded
student speech activities.
A. Barnette and Tinker: Establishing
Constitutional Norms in the Schools
More than fifty years ago, the Court recognized the importance
of protecting student First Amendment rights in the primary and
secondary school setting." In a student conduct case, West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court upheld the
students' right to be free from government-compelled speech.''' In
Barnette, members of a Jehovah's Witness congregation, on behalf of
children in public schools in West Virginia, challenged a state law
requiring all students to salute the flag and recite the pledge of alle-
giance. The Jehovah's Witnesses argued that the state regulation con-
flicted with their religious beliefs and improperly subjected children,
including their own children, to possible exclusion from school.
The Supreme Court held that requiring school children to salute
the United States flag violated the First Amendment by compelling
"affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind." 37 The Supreme Court
32
 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49.
35
 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-64.
54 See. ALEXANDER tVIEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL. FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL. POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 20-28 (1960).
55
 One should probably disregard the even earlier cases such as Prince v. Massachusetts, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, and Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the interests of children were central to the
litigation, because these cases were argued and decided in terms of fundamental parental rights.
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1949) (denying legal guardian's claim that state
cannot punish her under child labor law for bringing her niece with her to sell religious
magazines at night); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding proprietary
school owner's right to operate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that it was
unconstitutional for state to forbid educator from teaching German to students). However, these
cases support the general point that minors have First Amendment rights.
36 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
" Id. at 633, 642.
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recognized that school officials have an important interest in promot-
ing citizenship, 38 but declined to uphold the school's authority to
punish students engaged in an exercise of their religious faith. 39 School
officials must act within the limits of the Bill of Rights, the Court noted,
and should be held accountable as role models of constitutional ob-
servance for students. 4° The Court reasoned that the school's interest
in educating the students and promoting citizenship required "scru-
pulous protection of Constitutional freedoms," rather than acquies-
cence to a school board's overbroad exercise of plenary authority to
prescribe student conduct.'"
Indeed, the Court expressly recognized the need to cabin the
discretion of school authorities in order to facilitate political self-deter-
mination, even in the context of a primary school: That [states] are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes."42 Thus, Barnette
recognized the dual function of the public schools: they must inculcate
basic information, but they also serve as the training grounds of demo-
cratic self-government.43
Significantly, the Barnette Court expressly noted that judicial re-
view of the school administrator's action was important because school
officials in small, local jurisdictions might not fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities due to local political pressure." Highlighting the im-
portance of protecting individualism and diversity of thought, the
Court stressed that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."45
The respect for diversity underlying Barnette formed an important
part of the Court's holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
Id. at 637. "National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example
is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed
is a permissible means for its achievement." Id. at 640.
39 Id. at 640-42.
4° Id.
4 L See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
" Id. at 637.
43 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A school need not
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission' even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school." (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Seh. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Gordon Danning, Freedom of Speech in Public Schools: Using Communication.
Analysis to Eliminate the Role of Educational Ideoloo, 19 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 123 (1991).
44 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
4r' Id. at 642.
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munity School District. 46 In Tinker, the Court held that the First Amend-
ment protected expressive conduct by students in the secondary school
setting. 47 In Tinker, a number of students, including Tinker, donned
black armbands to protest the United States' involvement in the Viet-
nam War." Des Moines principals, fearing possible controversy and
disruption, directed the students to stop wearing the armbands at
school and suspended them when they refused to do so. The Des
Moines school superintendent then suspended three students for re-
fusing to obey the principals' directive.
Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas held that wearing an armband
to express a viewpoint was a symbolic act closely related to "pure
speech," and was, therefore, clearly protected under the First Amend-
ment." He wrote that neither "students [n] or teachers shed their
constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."5° The Court rejected the school officials' attempts to
defend their actions based on their fear of a disturbance arising from
the presence of the black armbands. 5 ' Justice Fortas emphasized re-
peatedly that the students' wearing of black armbands was divorced
from any actual or reasonably perceived disruptive conduct on their
part. He acknowledged that words spoken in school, whether in or out
of the classroom, might disrupt the normal school routine, but insisted
that the Constitution obliges schools to take that risk. 52 School officials
may censor student speech only when they can show that it "materially
and substantially interfere[s]" with the work of the school, school
discipline, or the rights of others in the school community."
16 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47 /d. at 513-14.
48 Id. at 504.
49 Id. at 505-06,513-14.
50 Id. at 506.	 •
51 'linker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506-09 (1969). The facts
indicated only "a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or distur-
bance on the part of petitioners." Id. at 508.
52 Id. at 508-09. justice Fortas cited precedent employing the clear and present danger
doctrine and used language reminiscent of that doctrine:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from
the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunch-
room, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk.
Id. at 508 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
53 Id. at 508-09,513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Burnside
involved the wearing of freedom buttons by black children in an all black Mississippi high school,
School officials forbade the students from wearing the buttons because they would cause a
disturbance in the classroom. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746-47. The Fifth Circuit held that the school.
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The Tinker Court held that students enjoyed at least some of the
rights of citizenship, including freedom of speech, and that student
speech in the classroom and even in less formal extracurricular activi-
ties warranted First Amendment protection. 54 Additionally, the Tinker
Court emphasized that a school official's discretionary authority is
limited greatly when the student conduct being regulated involves
political speech—even symbolic speech such as black armbands:
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communi-
cate. They may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved. . . .
. . . [It is not the function of the State to] conduct its
schools so as to "foster a homogeneous people."55
It is this openness to competing ideas, said Justice Fortas, "that is
the basis of our national strength and of the independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permis-
sive, often disputatious, society." 58
Invoking Barnette, the Tinker Court tied the students' protest to
the citizen-critic model: "That the [Boards of Education] are educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Con-
stitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes." 57 The Court concluded that "the
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools."58 Thus, in reconciling
the conflict between student speech rights and the authority of the
schools to abridge such rights," the Tinker Court struck a balance that
required tolerance of student speech activities at school.
district had a constitutional obligation to permit the children to wear the buttons. Id. at 748-49.
The court explained that, "wearing buttons on collars or shirt fronts is certainly not in the class
of activities which inherently distract students and breakdown the regimentation of the classroom
. . . ." Id. at 748.
54 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-14.
55 1d. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,402 (1923)).
56 Id. at 508-09.
57 Id. at 507; see MEticuilottN, supra note 34, at 20-28.
5g Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967)).
59 After establishing the proposition that students retain First Amendment speech rights in
school, the Court added:
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials ... to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools. Our problem lies in the area where students
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Although consideration of the school's educational mission led
the Court to apply a test that does not accord students the same speech
rights as those possessed by the person on the street, the Tinker test
emphasizes the democratic values at stake in students' speech 6° and
requires that the government provide substantial justification for bur-
dening the student speech activity. Both Barnette and Tinker provide
strong support to the proposition that student speech activity is entitled
to robust First Amendment protection. 6 '
B. Fraser and Hazelwood: The Inexplicable Retreat
Despite Tinker's emphasis on the importance of protecting diver-
sity of viewpoints within the school, the Supreme Court subsequently
has demonstrated its willingness to reject student free-speech claims
when the conduct at issue more closely involves the school's authority
over its curriculum.62 Although Tinker has not been expressly over-
turned,63
 the Supreme Court has severely circumscribed the applica-
tion of the Tinker test.
in the exercise of First. Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school
authorities.
393 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
66 The Tinker test does not require the state to offer a "compelling interest" to justify
restricting the students' speech activities, nor does it require a narrow tailoring of the school's
means to its educational objective. The test also lacks the immediacy of harm associated with the
"clear and present danger" doctrine, which is the equivalent of a strict scrutiny standard of review.
See Levin, supra note 15, at 1662 ("The Tinker standard clearly provides less protection for free
expression in the special environment of the schools than is available to the ordinary citizen").
For a contrary argument, i.e., that Tinker's standard is the equivalent of the First Amendment
standard applicable to adult speech, see Mark Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young Adult: A
Constitutional Framework, 1976 U. ILL L. REV. 746,759-60 (arguing that 'Tinker applies ordinary
First Amendment standards to the expressive activities of students in schools. No concessions in
doctrine were made to the special needs, if any, of schools, or to the immaturity of the stu-
dents.... The first amendment rights of young adults in schools are, according to Tinker, exactly
the same as those of adults.").
Gi
 Some commentators acknowledge the long tradition of court-employed rhetoric support-
ing the constitutional rights of minors, but discount its long-term significance. See William S.
Ceimer, Juvenileness: A Single-Edged Constitutional Sword, 22 CA. L. REV. 949, 949-50 (1988)
("Supreme Court cases have been characterized by declarations, often accompanied by soaring
rhetoric, that the constitutional guarantee at issue is indeed available to juveniles. However, the
Court also employs what I call 'juvenileness' to reach the conclusion that the young person loses."
(footnote omitted)).
62 In Tinker, the Court did not characterize the wearing of armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War as a curriculum-related matter. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510. The Tinker Court thus did
not rely on the school's articulated curricular position on the war, but rather on the school
authorities' exclusion of a particular viewpoint.
65
 For an argument that the adoption of public forum analysis necessarily entails a rejection
of Tinker, see Gordon Danning, supra note 43.
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The first major deviation from the Tinker"material and substantial
disruption" test occurred in 1986 in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser." Matthew Fraser, a high school honor student, delivered a
nominating speech on behalf of a classmate at a school-sponsored
assembly. To communicate the qualities of his candidate, throughout
his speech, Fraser made use of crude, if humorous, sexual innuendos."5
The record indicates that a few students hooted and hollered and
simulated sexual actions. Some students and teachers were offended
and upset.66
 The school subsequently suspended Fraser and removed
his name from the list of candidates for graduation speaker.
The Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision, upheld the disci-
plinary action against Fraser. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Bur-
ger reasoned that the school's legitimate interest in protecting the
student audience from exposure to lewd, vulgar, and plainly offensive
speech justified the school's disciplinary action." He further reiterated
the proposition that speech protected by the First Amendment for
adults is not necessarily protected for children, arguing that in the
public school context school authorities may take the sensibilities of
fellow students into consideration when regulating speech activities?'
Although Chief Justice Burger paid lip service to the importance
of permitting the expression of a variety of viewpoints in the schools,""
without hesitation, he deferred to the school authorities' conclusory
determination that Fraser's speech seriously disrupted the school's
educational activities. 7" Reasoning that the school's fundamental role
" 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
65
 The relevant portions of Fraser's speech, were as follows:
"1 know a man who is firm—he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm—hut most .. of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is
firm.
"Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. if necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.
',Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
"So vote fbr Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be."
Id. at 687 (Brennan,.]., concurring).
66 Id. at 678, 683.
67 Id. at 683-85.
68 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682-83.
69
 See id. at 681. "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." M. at 681.
7U
 "The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board." Id. at 683.
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was to instruct students about the "essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct,"7 ' the Court held that a school may suppress speech that does
not directly inculcate such lessons. 72
The Fraser Court distinguished Tinker based on the specific con-
tent of Fraser's speech. The majority held that the black armbands
at issue in Tinker expressed personal political beliefs that did not im-
pede any identified educational mission of the school; on the other
hand, the tawdry speech in Fraser interfered with the school's mission
of inculcating "habits and manners of civility." 73
 The Court found a
"marked distinction" between the double entendres contained in
Fraser's speech 74
 and the political message communicated through the
students' armbands in Tinker. 75
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stressed that school
officials acted only to ensure the orderliness of a high school assembly;
they did not attempt to discipline Fraser because they disagreed with
the content of his message. 75
 Thus, if the school's regulation of Fraser's
speech had been based on content, Justice Brennan would have found
that such regulation violated the Tinker test: "Courts have a First
Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric . . is not
suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the
vulgar.""
71 Id. Ironically, the school's mission includes teaching civil and effective public discourse.
"[P]ublic education must prepare pupils fOr citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate
the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indis-
pensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation." Id. at 681 (quoting
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
72 Id. at 685-86. There are limits, however, both to permissible values the schools may specify
and to the degree students must conform to specified values. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 106 (1968) (establishment clause forbids state curricular goals that aid or oppose any relig-
ion); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (despite acknowledged
authority to teach patriotic values, state cannot require swearing of allegiance to the flag).
7s Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. The district court, the Ninth Circuit and the two dissenting justices
on the Supreme Court all concluded that the facts presented did not establish that Fraser had
created a "material and substantial disruption" of the school environment as required under
Tinker. Id. at 690, 693-96 (Marshall, J. & Stevens, j., dissenting).
74
 The FraserCourt noted that "[t]he pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly
offensive to both teachers and students—indeed to any mature person." Id. at 683. Arguably the
speech could not have been that offensive to many of the students because Fraser ultimately
delivered a commencement speech after being elected as a write-in candidate. See id. at 679.
75 Id. at 680.
76 Id. at 689. justice Brennan's emphasis on the particular facts, on the "weighty" state interest
involved, and on the absence of any evidence of impermissible motive to suppress certain speech,
all reflect a far more probing judicial inquiry than the majority undertook in its analysis. And yet
even justice Brennan did not engage in the active scrutiny suggested by Tinker. He did not require
the state to make any empirical showing that any alleged disruption interfered with the school's
curriculum. See id. at 687-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1057 (2d Cir, 1979) (Newman, j., concurring)); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
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The second major deviation from Tinker occurred only two years
later in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 78
 The issue involved the
extent to which school officials could exercise control over the content
of an official high school newspaper produced as part of a school
journalism class. Following the accepted practice in the Hazelwood
School District, the journalism teacher submitted printer proofs of the
forthcoming edition of the school newspaper, (ironically named Spec-
trum), to the principal for review prior to publication. The principal
expressed concern about the content and subject matter of two sto-
ries." One story described several students' pregnancies and the other
described the impact of divorce on the lives of students. The principal
was concerned that the articles interfered with the privacy of the
subjects involved and did not give family members an opportunity to
respond to remarks appearing in the articles or to object to their
publication. 8" Without providing the student writers with any notice or
opportunity to respond to his concerns, the principal directed that the
two articles be deleted from the newspaper because they were "inap-
propriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable."' Three Hazelwood stu-
dents, all staff members on the Spectrum, brought suit in federal court
alleging that the principal's acts of censorship violated their First
Amendment rights.
Citing Fraser, the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision,
upheld the principal's actions and thus expanded even further school
authorities' discretion to censor speech deemed to be inconsistent with
"educational objectives." 82
 Applying First Amendment forum analysis,"
78
 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
79
 Hazelwood has been succinctly and perhaps accurately described by one court as a case
"upholding censorship of a school-sponsored student newspaper." Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Bd. of
Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D. Minn. 1990).
8° Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263.
81 Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting the decision below, Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986), reti'd, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)).
82 1d. at 273, 276.
83 1d. at 267-73. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-56
(1983), the Court defined the scope of the three categories of public forums, In "quintessential"
public forums, such as streets and parks, government inay regulate on the basis of content only
if it can show a compelling state interest and a narrowly drawn regulation to achieve that end.
Id. at 44. The state may also impose reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner regula-
tions. Id. The law must serve significant government interests and must leave open alternative
channels of communication. Id. A limited public forum is public property that the state has
opened up or designated as a place for expressive activity. Id. at 45. The same First Amendment
principles apply in a limited public forum as in a traditional public forum. Id. A nonpublic forum
is public property that "is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."
Id. at 46. Regulation in a nonpublic forum need only be viewpoint-neutral and rational. Id.
In dictum, the Hazelwood majority stated that;
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other
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the Court held that the newspaper constituted a "school-sponsored
activity" representing the school's views rather than a public forum"
for student viewpoints because it was funded by the school and pub-
lished as a function of a school journalism class."5 Because the student
writing in the Spectrum was deemed to be a part of the school's educa-
tional curriculum,'" which the school was entitled to regulate in any
"reasonable manner," the Court followed Fraser's reasoning and de-
ferred to the school authorities' determination that the articles were
inappropriate."
The Court concluded that the Tinker standard of "material and
substantial disruption" was not applicable to student speech activities
if the speech at issue occurs incident to a school-sponsored activity. 88
When student expression is part of a curriculum-related activity, school
officials may exercise editorial control over the "style and content" of
the student speech "so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."'• Without explaining the legal limits
of the "pedagogical concerns" exception to Tinker, the Court went on
to hold that judicial intervention would be justified only when a "de-
cision to censor a school-sponsored . . . vehicle of expression," includ-
ing publications and theatrical productions, has "no valid educational
traditional public forums that "time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions." Hence, school facilities may be classified as public forums only if school
officials have "by policy or by practice" opened those facilities "for indiscriminate
use by the general public" or by some segment of the public, such as student
organizations.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
84 Id. at 267-70. Many commentators have noted that the public forum analysis is poorly
suited to the resolution of free speech controversies that arise in public schools. See, e.g., C.
Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 CP:o.
WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 IA. L. ity.v. 1219 (1989);
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the
Return of F(YrnialiStlt, 7 Caanozo L. REA', 335 (1986).
85 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266-70; see also Buss, supra note 15, at 512-13, 520-22 (agreeing
with majority's rejection of the Spectrum as a thrum for student free speech),
86 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. The Court expansively interpreted the category of student
expression subject to censorship as that occurring in school publications and all school-sponsored
activities (including extracurricular activities). Id. at 273.
87 Id. at '273, 276. For a discussion of the theory that the Hazelwood holding focused on
control over conummication of the school's views, see Buss, supra note 15, at 513 ("the Hazelwood
decision is best explained in terms of the school's power to control its communicative resources,
rather than as a power to regulate student speech").
" See Hazelwood, 984 U.S. at 270.
" Id. at 273.
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purpose.'" Applying the new standard, the Court found that the prin-
cipal's stated concerns about disruption were reasonable, and held that
his censorship was a lawful response to that threat.•'
In so holding, the Hazelwood Court granted school officials sweep-
ing authority to censor expression in school-sponsored activities. To be
sure, the Court attempted to distinguish the student expression in
Tinker from the facts at issue in Hazelwood, arguing that Tinker involved
the personal expression of students that merely happened to occur on
school premises."2
 Consequently, it was appropriate in Tinker to accord
the speech activity First Amendment protection. Hazelwood, on the
other hand, involved speech in a curricular context, and thus placed
the school in a position of appearing to promote or support particular
student speech with school resources. Consistent with this line of rea-
soning, the school officials were therefore entitled to greater control
over the curriculum-related forms of student expression.
After reiterating Tinker's assertion of free speech rights inside the
schoolhouse gate, the court in Hazelwood noted that students cannot
be punished for expressing their views on school premises, in the
absence of good evidence of potential material and substantial disrup-
tion, "whether 'in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours."'" Significantly, the Court omit-
ted the sentence preceding the quoted language stating that a "stu-
dent's rights, therefore do not embrace merely the classroom hours.'
The Court thus made a feeble attempt to distinguish Tinker. Arguably,
the Hazelwood Court overruled Tinker—at least in part."'
Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in a spir-
ited dissent which, in part, decried this implicit overruling of Tinker.
Justice Brennan reminded the majority that the standard of "material
and substantial disruption" in Tinker applied whether the students'
conduct took place in the classroom or the cafeteria. The dissent's
approach did not recognize a dichotomy between student speech
rights in curricular and noncurricular contexts, but instead recognized
that student speech in a curricular context, such as the classroom, is
9° Id.
91 Id. at 273, 276.
92
 The Court thus declined to follow the Eighth Circuit's application of the Tinker standard.
Id. at 266-73, The lower court had determined that the school failed to demonstrate a reasonable
expectation that the censored materials would materially disrupt classwork. Kuhlmeier v. Hazel-
wood Sch, Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
95 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969)).
94 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
95
 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73, 276.
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more likely to result in a material disruption of pedagogy than speech
occurring in a noncurricular context. 96
 Although Justice Brennan ac-
knowledged the merit of the majority's concern that a student's view
might wrongfully be perceived as the school's own expression, he
stated that the principal should have considered less restrictive alter-
natives to deletion of the articles, such as revision of the articles in
response to his concerns. 97
Hazelwood extended Fraser's deference to school authorities' regu-
lation of student speech by making a distinction between tolerating
and promoting student speech. According to the Court, the First
Amendment requires schools to tolerate personal student speech that
"happens to occur on the school premises" but is unrelated to the
curriculum." On the other hand, if student speech activity is curricu-
lum-related, it might be perceived by students, staff and outsiders
as having the school's sanction." In consequence, schools have the
authority to regulate (or even prohibit) such speech.m
Under the Hazelwood standard, the school's decision to suspend
the students in Tinker arguably would have been upheld.' 91 Applying
Hazelwood, any student speech inside the classroom, including the
wearing of armbands, could be viewed as school-sanctioned or ap-
proved and, therefore, subject to regulation. 02 In effect, Hazelwood
overruled Tinker by severely circumscribing the decision's applicability.
96 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He suggested that use of a disclaimer or a school
statement disassociating itself from the article would be more sensitive to First Amendment
concerns. Moreover, the principal excised six articles because he objected to two. Rearranging
the layout or delaying publication, justice Brennan argued, would have been preferable. Id. at
289-90.
98 See id. at 270-71.
99 Id. at 270-73.
tat Id. The Court addressed the question of "whether the First Amendment requires a school
to tolerate particular student speech" that challenges the "educators' ability to silence a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises" and found that Tinker requires
toleration. Id. at 270-71. However, the Court went on to question "whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech" and concluded that the
issue "concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to hear the imprimatur of the school." Id.
Hu See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
192 See id. The Court in Hazelwood stated, "these activities may fairly be characterized as part
of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long
as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills
to student participants and audiences." Id.
For a discussion that Hazelwood limits only student speech that may be perceived as school-
promoted and thereby falls under First Amendment limitations on government speech, see Mark
G. Udof, Personal Speech and Government Expression, 38 CASE W. RI's. L. REV. 671,693-94 (1988)
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The Court's invocation of the rational basis standard translates
into essentially no judicial review of the school authorities' conduct.
Under Hazelwood, courts have no obligation to weigh or investigate the
government's interest in excluding student speech or the availability
of less restrictive alternatives to an outright bar. A school's speech
regulation has a reasonable relation to the school's curriculum unless
it completely lacks "any valid educational purpose."'"s Under the Hazel-
wood standard, if student expression interferes with the school's power
"to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is de-
signed to teach," 144 school officials may restrict it. Thus, although the
Court in Fraser had declared that students have an "undoubted free-
dom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms,"'" the practical effect of the Fraser/ Hazelwood judicial def-
erence to school officials leaves little real protection for student expres-
sion not endorsed by school authorities.'" In short, the school authori-
ties may label the speech and then suppress it, without fear of serious
judicial oversight.
The Fraser/ Hazelwood framework largely ignores the reality that
schools, as a practical matter, are the only forum in which minors may
express themselves publicly. Under Fraser and Hazelwood' s broad defi-
nition of "curriculum" and concomitant deference to school authori-
ties, the schools have wide power to regulate and exclude student
speech. This deference reflects judicial abdication of substantive review
of restrictions on student speech activities.
HI. AsSESS1NG THE AFTERMATH:
THE LEGACY OF FRASER AND HAZELWOOD
Not surprisingly, many federal courts have upheld local school
officials' restrictions on student expression in the wake of the Fraser
and Hazelwood decisions. For example, in Poling v. Murphy school
authorities disqualified a high school student from candidacy for stu-
("Kuhinieier 'valid educational purpose' test applies only to government expression in the public
schools. The Tinherdisruption test remains applicable to the studentsOwn expression.") (footnote
omitted).
103 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Only then is the First Amendment "so 'directly and sharply
itriplicateldr as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights," Id.
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
1" Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. The Court offered two further justifications for restricting
student speech: readers or listeners 'night be exposed to material inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and the views of individual speakers might be attributed to the school. Id. at 271-73.
1°s Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
106 See Krizck v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (broadly applying
the Hazelwood standard to uphold restrictions on the content of classroom materials).
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dent council president after he delivered a speech criticizing school
authorities at a school-sponsored candidates' assembly.'° 7 The principal
found Poling's speech "inappropriate, disruptive of school discipline,
and in bad taste," and therefore disqualified Poling as a candidate for
office."
Applying the lenient standard of scrutiny established in Fraser and
Hazelwood, Judge Nelson, writing for the majority, deferred to the
judgment of the local school authoritiesm and affirmed a grant of
summary judgment in their favor. Judge Nelson initially determined
that the election assembly and election were both "school-sponsored"
activities within the meaning of Hazelwood."° Applying the Hazelwood
test, the court then concluded that the school authorities had acted
appropriately by sanctioning the student speech, explaining that
speech sponsored by the school is subject to "greater control" by school
authorities than personal speech because educators have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that students involved in school-sponsored activi-
ties learn intended lessons and values related to proper pedagogical
concerns."' Although it recognized that independent thought and
frank expression "occupy a high place on our scale of values, or ought
to,"" 2 the court found that "'shared values of a civilized social order,"
namely discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority, fall within the
universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns." 4 Thus, "lilt was not
107 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990). Poling, a candidate for
student government, said that
"The administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't notice.
For example, why does [Assistant Principal) Davidson stutter while he is on the
intercom? He doesn't have a speech impediment. If you want to break the iron grip
of this school, vote for me for president. I can try to bring hack student rights that
you have missed and maybe get things that you have always wanted. All you have
to do is vote for me, Dean Poling."
Id. at 759. Poling's first draft of the speech had been reviewed by a faculty member, who advised
Poling to change the reference to the administration's "iron grip." After the review, however,
Poling added the remark about the assistant principal's stutter. Id.
108 Id. Although students responded to Poling's speech with comments such as "way to go,
Dean" and "we don't like him either," the evidence suggested that "Nile clapping, yelling, and
so forth did not go 'above or beyond that present for any of the candidates.'" Id. The principal
was upset, however, and other students "complained that Dean Poling had gained an unfair
advantage." Id. at 759-60.
1 " Id. at 762-63 ("[l]ocal school officials [are] better attuned than we to the concerns of the
paten ts/tiucpayers who employ them"). Id. at 762.
li n Id. "School officials scheduled the assembly to be held during school hours and on school
property. . . . And they vetted the speeches in advance, correcting inappropriate grammar and
attempting to weed out or temper inappropriate content." Id.
In Id. at 762-63.
112 Poling, 872 F.2d at 762.
513 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
114 Poling, 872 F.2d at 762.
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irrational, to say the least, for the school authorities to take offense at
a remark that was calculated to get [Poling] votes at the expense of
the assistant principal's dignity. "115
The Poling court never explicitly examined the appropriateness of
the school authorities' determinations and disciplinary actions, stating
merely that determining the most appropriate course of conduct was
a decision "best left to the locally-elected school board, not to a distant,
life-tenured judiciary.'" The court emphasized that "local school offi-
cials . . . must obviously be accorded wide latitude in choosing which
pedagogical values to emphasize, and in choosing the means through
which those values are to be promoted."" 7
 Assuming this deferential
stance, the court did not consider whether the authorities' disapproval
of Poling's ideas was proper, instead holding that Poling communi-
cated his ideas in an unacceptable manner that justified the school
authorities' decision to sanction hirn. 118
The case of Dean Poling reveals the breadth of the Fraser/Hazel-
wood doctrine. 1 9 On one level, it illustrates the problems inherent in
allowing the suppression of student speech based on a forum limitation
defined by the Hazelwood "school sponsorship" test. Poling demon-
strates that lower courts construe "school sponsorship" so broadly that
any events occurring at a primary or secondary school are at least
arguably connected to the school's curriculum.
At another level of analysis, courts have become very deferential
to suppression of student speech by school authorities who can offer
any reason for their action that is related to some pedagogical objec-
tive, however fanciful. This deference leaves open a black hole into
which school authorities may cast speech they dislike if the speech is
tainted by minor breaches of decorum, as in Poling. Even when student
speech does not demonstrably interfere with or disrupt either the
115 Id. at 763.
116 Id. at 761; see also Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding censorship
of student's valedictory speech for the graduation ceremony).
117
 Pain& 872 F.2d at 762. Although the court of appeals recognized that it was "obviously
not the ideal body" to judge the actions of the school authorities, the tone of the court's language
suggested that it did not fully agree with the school's actions. See id. The court noted: "[it] may
well be that a more relaxed or more self-assured administration would have let the incident pass
without declaring [Poling] ineligible, and perhaps that is what this administration ought to have
done." Id, at 761.
118 Id. at 763. The court noted: "Wile art of stating one's views without indulging in person-
alities and without unnecessarily hurting the Feelings of others surely has a legitimate place in
any high school curriculum.' Id.
119 Indeed, a primary or secondary school student wishing to engage in philosophical,
religious or political speech would be well-advised to consult with Judith Martin ("Miss Manners")
before opening her mouth in school because the consequences of even a minor or isolated breach
of decorum can be severe.
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schools' work or students' ability to learn an intended lesson, Poling
indicates that schools are under no constitutional obligation to allow
viewpoints that diverge from curricular lessons, that criticize school
administrators, or that support unpopular views. They can simply cen-
sor expression that they determine conflicts with "legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns," a concept so broad that its reach is practically limitless. 120
However, applying Tinker to all types of student speech, as some
commentators have suggested, would not cure the problem. Before
the advent of the rational basis standard, several courts had inter-
preted the Tinkerstandard broadly in order to censor indecent student
speech, speech they viewed as having a lesser value, particularly in the
school setting.' 21
To be sure, some lower federal courts have indicated dissatisfac-
tion with the lack of protection that the Hazelwood test provides to
student expression.' 22 Particularly in cases squarely raising political
l 2°An Arkansas federal district court also upheld a school's rejection of a student's candidacy
for student council office. Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15,745 F. Supp. 1455,1461 (E.D.
Ark. 199(1). The student claimed that teachers disapproved of his candidacy because of his
outspoken attitudes, but the court concluded that the teachers' actions were not taken to retaliate
but to foster the objectives of the Student Council. Id. at 1460. The court stated that having
teachers approve the candidates was related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, noting that
schools have an important role in teaching shared values. Id. The court acknowledged that
although independent thought and frank expression occupy a high place among these values,
discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority are also important. Id. at 1459-61.
121 For example, in Trachtman v. Ariker, 563 F.2d 512,519 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit
applied the "substantial disruption" test and upheld the school's prohibition on the distribution
to students of a sex questionnaire that the school officials claimed would cause "significant
psychological harm," Id. at 519-20. The school attempted to bolster the legitimacy of its concerns
with expert psychological testimony. Id. at 517-19. Similarly, in Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Stipp.
1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held that the school administrations had met the "substantial
disruption" test. Id. at 1050-51. There, a school seized an issue of the school newspaper that
printed a letter from the school lacrosse team that complained of the lack of sports coverage by
the newspaper, and which included a threat to "kick [the editor's] greasy ass." Id. at 1046. The
school's action was motivated by "the possibility that: 'an impressionable 14 year old member of
the freshman Lacrosse team [might] take the letter as a license to hunt up the sports editor for
the stated purpose of the letter," id. at 1051 (quoting affidavit of the principal), and that "'the
letter foreseeably could provoke a confrontation. . . .'" Id. (quoting affidavit of the newspaper's
faculty advisor).
As these cases indicate, the "material and substantial disruption" test failed to take into
account the different concerns that arise when the student speech is nonpolitical. The courts
wanted a lower standard and rather than adopting a new test to take into account the different
content of the speech, they merely interpreted the Tinker test loosely.
122 See McIntire v. Bethel Sch., 804 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D. Okla. 1992). McIntire involved school
authorities' prohibition on students wearing shirts with the words, "the best of the night's
adventures are reserved for people with nothing planned." Id. at 1418. The school district asserted
that the shirts violated the school's prohibition on attire advertising alcoholic beverages. Although
finding the school's prohibition on attire promoting liquor to be facially constitutional, the court
was not convinced that the phrase on the shirts would be perceived as encouraging the consurtip-
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speech rights, a few courts have refused to apply the more deferential
Hazelwood/Fraser standards.
For example, in 1992, in Chandler v. McMinnville School District,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of what standard should apply to
students' wearing buttons with the word "scab" to protest an Oregon
school board's hiring of replacement teachers for striking teachers.' 23
The court discussed both the Fraser and Hazelwood standards and held
that they did not apply in this case.' 24 The court first concluded that
the term "scab" could not be considered vulgar, lewd, obscene, or
plainly offensive and thus the Fraser test did not apply.' 25 The court also
found that the Hazelwood test would not apply as the buttons could not
conceivably have been viewed as representing the school's point of
view.' 26
The Chandler court concluded that the expression fell within the
small category of student speech activity still governed by the Tinker
disruption standard.'" Rejecting the school officials' claim that the
"scab" buttons were inherently disruptive, the court remanded the case
to provide the school district with an opportunity to prove that the
buttons actually presented a reasonable risk of disruption. 12" The court
noted that evidence that the buttons were insulting and directed to-
ward replacement teachers "would bear upon the issue of whether the
buttons might reasonably have led school officials to forecast substan-
tial disruption to school activities." 12" Although the court concluded
that Tinker governed the constitutional protection afforded to the
buttons at issue in Chandler, it recognized that student attire consid-
ered vulgar or plainly offensive could be curtailed without being linked
to a disruption. 13°
Lion of liquor simply because of its similarity to a slogan previously used to advertise Bacardi Rum.
Noting that the only disruption associated with wearing the shirts occurred after the superinten-
dent banned the slogan in question, the court granted a preliminary injunction against applying
the school district's dress code to these shirts. Id. at 1426-29. 'Me court concluded that neither
Fraser nor Hazelwood governs all school regulation of student expression that might reasonably
be viewed as representing views of the school itself, and therefore held that the Tinkertest applied.
Id. at 1426-27.
125 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
124 Id. at 529-30.
I 25 /d. at 529.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 529-30.
129 Chandler, 978 F.2d at 530-31.
129 Id. at 531.
Is° Id. at 529. For example, a Virginia middle-school student was unsuccessful in challenging
her one-day suspension for refusing to change her shirt printed with the words "Drugs Suck."
Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Stipp. 1526, 1537 (E.D. Va. 1992). The court recognized that
regardless of whether "sucks" connotes a sexual meaning, its use is offensive and vulgar to many
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Another court attempted to remedy the lack of meaningful judi-
cial review under Fraser and Hazelwood by interpreting Hazelwood nar-
rowly. 13 ' In Romano v. Harrington, a tenured English teacher was re-
leased from his position as advisor to the high school newspaper after
publication of a student's editorial opposing the then-proposed federal
holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr. The teacher brought suit, and the
court denied the school board's request for summary judgment. The
board claimed that its action regarding the controversial anti-King
article was reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical goal of
"minimizing tensions within an integrated student body that had ex-
perienced occasional racial conflicts."'"
Rejecting the broad interpretation of school sponsorship as per-
taining to all extracurricular activities, the court distinguished the
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood, which was part of a class, from the
extracurricular paper in this case. Reasoning that "inroads on the First
Amendment in the name of education are less warranted outside the
confines of the classroom and its assignments,"'" the court was not
willing to equate an extracurricular, though school-funded, paper with
a publication that is part of a journalism class.' 31
These cases, however, are exceptions to the prevailing trend. In
most post-Hazelwood decisions, courts have expanded the discretion of
school authorities to censor student expression by broadly defining
what constitutes school-sponsored expression and legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns. They have restricted application of the Tinker disruption
standard to student expression that clearly does not give the appear-
ance of representing the school.' 35
people, including some middle school students. Citing Fraser, the court found that the school
administration's action was permissible "to regulate middle school children's language and
channel their expression into socially appropriate speech." Id. at 1537; see also Cano v. School
Dist., 674 F. Supp. 796, 798 (D. Idaho 1987) (holding that a public school could prevent a student
from wearing a T-shirt that depicted three school administrators drunk because the shirt under-
mined the administrators' authority); Olesen v. Board of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (N.D.
111. 1987) (upholding a policy prohibiting male students from wearing earrings, reasoning that
the policy was rationally related to the school's legitimate objective of deterring gangs, which
sometimes used earrings to symbolize membership).
131
 Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
132 1d. at 688.
133 Id. at 690.
134 The court stated:
[Blecause Hazelwood opens the door to significant curtailment of cherished First
Amendment rights, this court declines to read the decision with the breadth its
dictum invites. Because educators may limit student expression in the name of
pedagogy, courts must avoid enlarging the venues within which that rationale may
legitimately obtain without a clear and precise directive.
Id. at 689.
135 For example, in Olesen, an Illinois federal court rejected a First Amendment challenge to
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IV. BEYOND HAZELWOOD AND FRASER:
A CONTENT-SPEC:WIC APPROACH
The current First Amendment framework applicable to student
speech fails to protect adequately student expressive activity. In bal-
ancing the freedom to advocate unpopular or controversial views in
primary and secondary schools against society's interest in teaching
students the boundaries of civil behavior, the courts should not auto-
matically favor school officials' interest in advancing curricular objec-
tives over student speech activities.
Absent from the Court's current First Amendment jurisprudence
is a recognition that protecting student speech serves important social
and civic values. Although school officials may have legitimate and
even compelling reasons for silencing particular student speech in
some specific contexts, these facts provide no justification for abandon-
ing a priori the values and principles articulated in Barnette and Tinker
in favor of a rational basis test. School administrators and officials
should not be regarded as benevolent dictators.' 36 They should be
limited by a guiding principle recognizing that students' speech rights
have value and deserve greater First Amendment protection in appro-
priate contexts.
Courts must not permit school officials to squelch student expres-
sion for any reason, however arbitrary or subjective. On the other
hand, not all student speech activity should receive a high level of
protection under the First Amendment. In short, courts must evaluate
the strength of a student's speech claim on a content-specific basis,
providing greater First Amendment protection for student political
speech, while applying a lower standard of review to scholastic and
obscene/indecent speech. The Fraser/ Hazelwood test, on the other
an anti-gang policy that prohibited students from wearing or displaying any indicia of gang
membership on or about school property," and even from "us [log] any speech, either verbal or
non-verbal (gestures, handshakes, etc.), showing membership or affiliation in is gang." 676 F.
Stipp. at 822. The court found that the student's professed message of "individuality" was not
protected speech under the First Amendment.
Several commentators have noted that the Tinker test is not sufficiently precise for applica-
tion to nonprotest student speech activity. See, e.g., Donning, supra note 43, at 128-29 (noting
that in most student speech cases, the harm the school seeks to prevent is not so immediate and
tangible as the direct interruption of class meetings); Susan Garrison, Comment, The Public School
as Public Forum, 54 Tx. L. REV. 90, 113 (1975) (noting that problems exist because "lejssential
to a definition of disruption is identification of the disrupted endeavor").
IN4 The courts have not always been in agreement with the decision of school authorities, but
feel bound by the current rationality test to defer to their decisions. For example, in Poling, the
court acknowledged that it did not completely agree with the school's decision to sanction
Poling's speech. 872 F.2d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1989).
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hand, treats all speech as having equal value; the result of this analytical
approach is decisions that appear arbitrary and unfair.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the Fraser/ Hazelwood regime,
a one-size-fits-all approach to "protecting" student expression has some
support in the legal academy. A number of scholars have argued that
public school officials must be granted a great deal of discretion in
their administration of a primary or secondary school in order to
ensure that such schools operate efficiently.' 37 They suggest that local
authorities are in the best position to judge what students should learn
and what they should not, whether through formal instruction or
informal peer association. Defenders of the status quo argue that the
Fraser/ Hazelwood test provides needed flexibility to school officials,
thereby allowing them to maintain order and discipline.' 38
Conversely, a number of academicians have questioned the mini-
mal protection accorded to student speech rights under the current
test and have put forth a variety of proposals for reform. Some com-
mentators have advocated providing students with the same First
Amendment protections as adults.' 39 Others have suggested that legis-
lative action may be the only hope for increased protection of student
speech.'"
Neither the advocates nor the critics of the Fraser/ Hazelwood ana-
lytical framework have adequately identified the central problem with
a test that focuses on the effect of speech on a school's curriculum or
whether the speech activities might be attributed to the school: the test
treats all student speech the same, regardless of the values implicated.
137 See Keiter, supra note 11 at 47-55; Alan Goldberg, Comment, Textbook Removal Decisions
and the First Amendment —A Better Balance, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1317, 1338-39 (1989) (arguing that
local school boards need broad discretionary powers in the First Amendment area).
I" See Christopher" Palermo, Only the News That's Fit to Print: Student Expressive Rights in
Public School Communications Media After Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 11 HASTINGS Comm. & ENT.
L.J. 35, 51-52, 69 (1988) (arguing that although Hazelwood was correctly decided to provide local
school boards with the necessary authority to run their schools effectively, but acknowledging
that the holding is vulnerable to excessively broad interpretation).
I" See Celia Rooney, Note, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools
— 
Fraser
v. Bethel Sch. District Revisited, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 473, 473 (1986) (arguing that public school
students should have free expression rights coequal to those of adults in public forums); see also
Martha M. McCarthy, Ph.D., Post -Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to Free Inquiry in Public
Schools, 81 Eouc. L. REP. 685 (1993).
14° Stir Robert" Shoop, Ph.D., States Talk Back to the Supreme Court: "Students Should be Heard
as Well as Seen", 59 EDUC. L. REP. 579, 585-86 (1990) (providing a review of state legislature,
school board, and educational organization responses to the Fraser and Hazelwood decisions).
Indeed, several state legislatures have considered enacting legislation that would safeguard
the free speech rights of students. For example, in 1989, the Ohio general assembly considered
enacting a bill to guarantee the freedom of speech, assembly and press to public school students.
Id.
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Although the rational basis test might seem appropriate to student
expression that is obscene, it is inappropriate as a First Amendment
matter to treat political and scholastic speech activities no better than
smut. The protection of First Amendment values requires a more
content-sensitive approach.
By developing a content-sensitive system of evaluating students'
speech rights in the schools, the federal courts could select and apply
a level of judicial scrutiny appropriate to the nature and content of the
students' expression. Consistent with such an approach, the courts
could provide schools with the authority necessary to regulate indecent
or disruptive speech without unnecessarily sacrificing a student's inter-
est in engaging in speech activities about controversial social and
political issues, and other entirely appropriate matters of the day.' 4 '
Although a content-specific approach may appear at first to be a
radical departure from the content neutrality project, 142 such an ana-
lytical framework would be little different from the courts' current First
Amendment jurisprudence.'`° Courts have properly treated some types
of speech as having higher First Amendment value than other kinds
of speech and have made frequent references to the constitutional
inequality of speech activities.'" The courts, moreover; have consis-
141 A number of efforts to fashion a hierarchical approach have attempted to limit the bias
against content-based regulation to viewpoint discrimination. Under this theory, distinctions
based on the subject_ matter or Form of the speech would not trigger close judicial scrutiny, absent
evidence that the government was taking sides, favoring one viewpoint over another. See Daniel
A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. Ctn. L. REV. 81 (1978). Both authors warn of the danger that subject-matter
restrictions, although superficially viewpoint-neutral, present a compelling case for content-based
scrutiny because of the potential for corrupt viewpoint bias.
142
 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum
Analysis, 104 YALE LJ. 1411, 1424 (1995) (arguing that consideration of context is essential to
applying the First Amendment properly); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 CoLum. L. REV. 449, 449-52 (1985) (arguing that context is an important element
of contemporary First Amendment analysis).
143 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 141 at 727-28; Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. Ctn. L. Ritv. 20 (1976); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and
Categories o [Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAN!). L. REV. 265 (1981); Paul B. Stephan III, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 203-07 (1982) (noting that the
approach reflected in the Court's free speech opinions posits some hierarchy of values entitled
to constitutional protection); Stone, supra note 141, at 81-82. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 940 (2d ed. 1988) (commenting that "[al hierarchy of ever-pro-
liferating intermediate categories requires the Court to assign relative values to different classes
of expression, a task that is all but impossible to reconcile with the basic theory of the First
Amendment").
I 44 A plurality in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976), upholding a
zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult movie theaters, endorsed the principle that it
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tently considered the content of a student's speech activity. Indeed,
opinions from several courts, including the Supreme Court, indicate
that they have implicitly considered the nature of the speech before
determining whether to apply Fraser/ Hazelwood or Tinker.
For example, in Fraser, the controversial nature of the student's
speech clearly influenced Chief Justice Burger's holding. His opinion
reflects a subjective value judgment that indecent speech deserves less
constitutional protection than other kinds of speech. Thus, Chief Jus-
tice Burger distinguished Tinker and refused to apply its test to Fraser's
speech, based at least in part on the theory that Tinker involved politi-
cal speech activity, which the First Amendment has traditionally all
forded the greatest degree of protection.'" Because the speech in-
volved in Fraser was, at least in the majority's view, indecent speech, it
did not merit the same level of protection.'" The majority, therefore,
applied a lower level of scrutiny that it believed appropriately reflected
the value our society places on bawdy speech."'
Additionally, Judge Merritt, in his dissenting opinion in Poling,
indicated that because of the political content of Poling's speech he
believed that it deserved greater protection than the Fraser/ Hazelwood
standards would provide.'" Judge Merritt stated explicitly that "[t] he
Court [in this case] has applied the wrong First Amendment test to
this student's political speech and has therefore reached the wrong
result."'" In Judge Merritt's view, the political nature of Poling's speech
was a more important factor in determining the level of protection the
speech should receive than whether the speech was connected with the
school's curriculum or was merely personal.' 5° Under Judge Merritt's
view, Poling's speech, as political expression, should have been entitled
is manifest that society's interest in protecting [non-obscene, sexually indecent speech] is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammelled political debate . . .
See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (stating "this Court has long recog-
nized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance"); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986); Stephan, supra note 143, at 203-07 (noting that the Court
has never embraced a rule of absolute content neutrality because that would deny the government
the power to distinguish speech falling within the ambit of the First Amendment from that falling
without).
145 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680-87 (1986); see MEIKLEJOHN,
note 34, at 20-28; W0.1.1Aba W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 41-42
(1984) (describing the First Amendment's protection of speech activities as a series of concentric
circles, each farther away from a "core" of political speech).
146 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
147 See, iii,
148 Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 765-66 (6th Cir. 1989) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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to greater First Amendment protection, whether or not it conflicted
with the school's intended lesson.
A better approach would be to divide student speech into three
categories: political, scholastic, and obscene/indecent. After determin-
ing the appropriate speech category, a reviewing court would then
apply a corresponding level of scrutiny appropriate to the speech. The
mechanics of applying this approach, and the practical difficulties that
would have to be overcome to implement it, are discussed below.
A. Political Speech
Political speech has traditionally been accorded the greatest First
Amendment protection in our society. 151
 In myriad contexts and in a
variety of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that political speech is
qualitatively different from other kinds of speech as a First Amendment
matter. 152
 Likewise, when student expression involves political speech,
the burden should be on the school to demonstrate that the regulation
or censorship was narrowly tailored to effect a compelling school
interest or to prevent an imminent threat of disruption.'" Thus, al-
though a school in the inner city of Detroit could legally prohibit a
student from wearing a Junior Klansman's robes based on the immi-
nent threat of harm, the same school probably could not establish the
same threat of harm from a student's wearing a button supporting
Phyllis Schlafly, Lyndon LaRouche, or Patrick Buchanan.
The narrow tailoring prong of the test would necessarily be site-
specific.' 54
 For example, a school in New Mexico might permit students
to demonstrate against Christopher Columbus's treatment of Ameri-
151 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SEL•COVERNMENT 26
(1948) (lust so f'ar as, at any point, the citizens who arc to decide an issue are denied acquain-
tance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue,
just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good."); William
W. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at Stale Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, I l 1 U.
PA. L. REv. 328, 337-39 (1963). In Poling, Judge Merritt lamented that "Jr the school administra-
tion can silence a student criticizing it for being narrow minded and authoritarian, how can
students engage in political dialogue with their educators about their education?" 872 F.2d at 766
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
152 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 552-58 (1975);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44749 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S 47, 52
(1919).
03 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (stating that,
"in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcame
the right to freedom of expression").
154
 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (endorsing a First Amendment jurispru-
dence, at least insofar as the regulation of obscenity is concerned, sensitive to the vagaries of local
(:onditions).
148	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:119
can Indians on Columbus Day, whereas a school in a heavily Italian
section of New York City might legitimately prohibit such a demonstra-
tion because of the threat of disruption. 155
B. Scholastic Speech
Student speech in the scholastic category would include speech
that is school-sponsored or that occurs during a school program that
a reasonable student or member of the community might reasonably
attribute (at least in part) to the school. For example, the concept
encompasses student science fair projects, student book reports, stu-
dent plays, student newspapers and student fund-raising and market-
ing efforts on behalf of student clubs. Because this student speech can
be attributed directly to the school, the school must have a greater
ability to regulate it.' 56
 This is so because such speech implicates the
community's interest in inculcating its values through the curriculum
of the public schools.
To evaluate student speech claims in this category, the courts
should apply the First Amendment test enunciated in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission applicable to commer-
cial speech. 157 Under the Central Hudson test, truthful speech may be
regulated if the government interest is substantial, the regulation di-
rectly advances the government interest and the regulation is no more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 158
Applying the Central Hudson test in the school context, a reviewing
court would first consider whether the school's interest in preventing
155 This analysis causes difficult problems because general First Amendment principles do
not permit the "heckler's veto" to override political speech activities. See Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). In the context of the schools, however, providing
Intl protection against the heckler's veto could preclude the attainment of educational objectives.
Thus, a conflict exists between the heckler's veto and the school's educational mission, which
might require a modified heckler's veto analysis. The formation of such a modified heckler's veto
requires further development and is beyond the scope of this article.
156 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Chief Justice Burger
feared that controversial student speech activities occurring within the school's official curricu-
lum would he attributed to the school itself. The fear is that toleration of student speech in certain
contexts would be viewed as promotion or endorsement of the speech by the school, and thus,
by implication, attributed to the community. The problem with this is that the community may
not embrace the values reflected in the student speech activities, much less wish them to be
inculcated into their children.
157
 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
158 Id. The courts reason that commercial speech is more hardy and verifiable and hence less
dependant on judicial protection. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc„ 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). For a criticism of the tiered treatment of
commercial speech using the same critical attitude toward categorical rules developed in the
present article, see Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983).
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the student scholastic speech activity was substantial. To determine
whether the interest is substantial, the court would view the impact of
the regulated speech on the student body as a reasonable educator
would view it—would the student body and the school's community
impute the student speech to the school system? The court would then
determine whether the regulation directly advances a pedagogical
interest of the school. Finally, the court would determine whether the
regulation was narrowly tailored.
For example, suppose that a senior high school student decides
to prepare his book report for his social science class on Charles
Murray's The Bell Curve. Applying the Central Hudson test, the school
could attempt to establish that it has a substantial interest in prohibit-
ing the book report because it is inconsistent with the school's peda-
gogical mission with respect to race relations and teaching the science
of biology. The school would also assert that its decision to prohibit
the report would directly advance this interest. Finally, the school could
argue that this decision was narrowly drawn, only impacts a narrow
category and, if the speech were permitted, it could be directly im-
puted to the school. Whether the school would prevail should depend
on the accuracy of these allegations; assuming that record evidence
would demonstrate their veracity, the school's interest in maintaining
its curriculum would outweigh the student's interest in academic free-
dom. 159
C. Obscene/Indecent Speech
The third category of student expression is obscene/indecent
speech, including sexual and scatologicaI 160
 speech. 161
 The current
159 0f course, the student would be free to discuss the book and his views about the book
during lunch times, recess, study hall and after school. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting
Tinker, 363 U.S. at 512-13). Such student activities are not school-sponsored and would not fall
within this test. Moreover, student speech occurring during such times would not be attributed
to the school,
Since 1984 students have not had to rely on the First Amendment in their efforts to hold
student gatherings for expressive purposes in public high schools, Under the Equal Access Act
("EAA"), if federally assisted secondary schools provide a limited open forum for noncurriculum
student groups to meet during noninsn -uctional time, access cannot be denied to specific groups
based on the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the groups' meetings. 20
U.S.C. § 4071 (1994); see also Hoard of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (rejecting an
establishment clause challenge to the FAA).
16() Additionally, this category would include statements about other school students or school
officials that involve those officials' private lives. For example, publication of an article concerning
a sexual liaison between the football coach and the principal's wife would most likely not be
allowed.
191
 For adults, profane, indecent, lewd, vulgar, offensive speech is not legally obscene speech
unless it satisfies the Supreme Court's controlling three-part definition fashioned in Miller v.
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Fraser/ Hazelwood rational basis standard should govern speech claims
falling within this category. However, reviewing courts should place a
greater emphasis on the purpose of the speech.
In most instances, indecent speech will add little to the school's
curriculum. At the same time, however, such speech will not detract
from the curriculum either.' 62
Many, if not most, claims arising under this category will involve
regulations governing student clothing and dress codes. A school ad-
ministrator could reasonably determine that hot pants, sheer blouses
and T-shirts with phrases such as "Fuck You" or "Pinch the Tail and
Suck the Head" printed on them do not convey a political message,
are not within the ambit of academic freedom, and could impede the
attainment of legitimate pedagogical objectives. In consequence, it is
appropriate to vest school administrators with discretion to regulate or
ban such messages within the schools.
However, courts must take into account the context of such speech
and the overall thrust of its message. Courts should not be overly hasty
to apply a rational basis standard to student speech that is merely in
bad taste or mildly shocking. For example, shocking or disturbing
speech such as T-shirts emblazoned with "God is Dead" or "Drugs
Suck" should not go unprotected. If the Constitution permits an adult
to wear a jacket inscribed with the words "Fuck the Draft" in a court-
house, 163 then surely the First Amendment must provide some breath-
ing room for similar kinds of speech by students. Even student speech
that school authorities may consider gross or repellent oftentimes may
further First Amendment values.
* * *
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which requires that each element of a three-part test be
satisfied. To declare such speech obscene, a court must find that:
(a) ... "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . (b) . .
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id. (citation omitted).
' 62 For example, under this standard, the court should deny the school authorities the power
to regulate T-shirts stating "Drugs Suck" because the central message is political, i.e., drugs are
bad, and it outweighs any potential sexual message.
163 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY or CoNsxtrr 72 (1975); William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1595 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DuKE L.J. 283.
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A content-specific approach would permit courts to make rational
distinctions between the different kinds of speech activities that occur
in the school setting. When regulating student speech, courts could no
longer disregard the differing First Amendment value of various kinds
of speech in the same manner. Schools would be required to consider
the relative First Amendment value of the student speech. Students
should have opportunities to make political speeches and hold rallies
on important social and political controversies, and to express them-
selves through their academic endeavors. Because a content-specific
approach requires courts to weigh the relative value of speech against
the level of disruption that it would generate, it maximizes the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" function of the First Amendment without under-
mining the schools' "inculcation" role. 164
 In short, the language and
spirit of this approach rejects the current judicial avoidance of pro-
viding meaningful protection for student speech activities under the
Fraser/ Hazelwood rationality standard. A more refined analysis is both
necessary and proper.
D, The Problem of Viewpoint Discrimination
A number of academics have noted that content-specific First
Amendment tests could lead to viewpoint discrimination. For example,
Professor Laurence Tribe warns that "all attempts to create content-
based subcategories entail at least some risk that government will in
fact be discriminating against disfavored points of view." 165
The content-specific approach that I advocate does not sanction
subjective decisions by judges based on ideological factors. An impor-
tant distinction exists between viewpoint discrimination and content
discrimination.m Viewpoint discrimination involves the government's
choosing one side of an issue, promoting this position and prohibiting
16ISotne "hate speech" codes at the college level that impose prior restraints on student
expression of discriminatory epithets have been invalidated for being vague or overly broad. See,
e.g., The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 1 12 S. Ct. 2538,
2547-50 (1992) (invalidating Minnesota's hate crime statute as unconstitutionally prohibiting
otherwise permissible speech solely on the basis of its subject); Matt Helms, License to Hate, U.
THE NAT'L COLLEGE MAC., Aug.–Sept. 1992, at 14, 36. However, applying the Tinker disruption
standard, it appears that such expression could be curtailed among students at the K-12 level. See
David Schimmel, Are "Hate Speech" Codes Unconslilutional?
—An Analysis of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 74
Enna L. REP. (WEST) 653, 663-65 (1992).
165 'num, supra note 143, at 940.
us; See. Farber, supra note 141, at 735 (noting that viewpoint-based discrimination is clearly
more troublesome than subject-matter discrimination).
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discussion of alternative points of view. Viewpoint discrimination is
undesirable because it prevents a Full and fair discussion of an issue.' 67
A content-specific approach, however, does not have the effect of
limiting the scope or ferocity of debate. All viewpoints may compete
equally in the marketplace of ideas.' 68 Thus, content analysis involves
the application of a hierarchy to ensure that speech receives adequate
First Amendment protection. As a practical matter, this means that
varying levels of scrutiny must be applied to different kinds of speech.
A content-specific approach does not necessarily imply viewpoint dis-
crimination; all speech within a particular category is to be treated
similarly.
The content-specific approach would not necessarily provide a
different result from the use of the mere rationality standard in some
cases. Under this approach, a court could in its discretion still uphold
the principal's decision in Fraser to censor the mildly lewd speech. Such
a result, however, does not take away from the increased judicial review
provided to a majority of student expression claims. The content-spe-
cific approach not only requires a meaningful explanation from the
school officials for their actions, but also requires that the courts give
weight to student expression. This review will result in fewer instances
where students believe that school administrators have acted arbitrarily
and unfairly.
167 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969)
(public school prohibition against wearing of black armbands to protest American involvement
in Vietnam, in absence of prohibition against wearing other symbols of political or controversial
significance, unconstitutional viewpoint restriction); see, e.g., Letter from James Madison to WT.
Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives."); MEitaigmitv, supra note 151, at 26-27.
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a school board violated students' First Amendment
rights because it failed to produce a compelling justification for excluding an antidraft organiza-
tion's advertisement from the school newspaper while allowing military recruitment advertise-
ments. See San Diego Comm. Against Registration & Draft (Card) v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d
1471, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986). The court emphasized that even applying the rational basis standard,
such viewpoint discrimination was not permissible. Id.; see also Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314,
1324-26 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that school authorities had unconstitutionally excluded a
peace activist group from participating in the public school's career day and placing its literature
on school bulletin boards and in offices of school guidance counselors when military recruiters
were allowed such access); Clergy & Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 586 F. Stipp. 1408,
1413-14 (N.D. 111. 1984).
"Stone, .supra note 141, at 104-06.
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E. The Problem offudicial Discretion
A second criticism is that the content-specific approach increases
judicial discretion, and thus increases the likelihood that unfair or
arbitrary results will obtain.'"' Courts will be called on to determine
the precise nature of speech and to establish a "tolerable" level of
disruption. The decision to allow some student speech to occur even
at the cost of nontrivial disruption necessarily requires an exercise of
discretion. A judge's particular sensitivities may well determine the
level of First Amendment protection student speech receives. The
implementation of this approach will result in some students believing
that their speech rights have been unfairly denied or circumscribed.'"
In the school context, however, judicial discretion will not lead to
lesser protection of any student expression. The new approach creates
a hierarchy of speech rights that can be used to evaluate a majority of
student speech claims, setting forth a new constitutional ceiling but
not removing the rational basis floor that exists under Fraser/ Hazel-
woodYn Thus, application of a content-specific analysis will not leave
any student speech less protected than it is under current law. Instead,
the content-specific test would provide a higher degree of protection
in appropriate circumstances.
Courts applying existing First Amendment jurisprudence applica-
ble to adult speech activity exercise a similar kind of discretion when
deciding how to classify particular kinds of speech.' 72 If anything, the
existing rational basis standard is more troublesome, because it con-
cludes before any balancing occurs that student speech activities enjoy
little, if any, protection.
Judges under the content-specific approach will have to use their
discretion to characterize the nature of student speech involved in a
student speech claim. Although this task is not an easy one and creates
the possibility of an arbitrary characterization of speech (and perhaps
a denial of First Amendment protection in individual cases), the bene-
Mu See Lawrence C. George, King Solomon's Judgment: Expressing Principles opiirretion and
Feedback in Legal Rules and Reasoning, 30 HASTINGS U. 1549,1559-66,1573-75 (1979); Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515,1524,1538-30 (1991).
17° For example, a reviewing court may uphold a school's determination that a student should
not be allowed to wear a black T-shirt with a pink triangle because this speech is obscene rather
than political. Under such a holding, the student's ability to express his beliefs is greatly dimin-
ished. However, by providing courts with a greater role in reviewing speech claims, such decisions
will not often occur and would most likely be reversed on appeal.
t71 See Krotoszynski, supra note 142, at 1438.
172 VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 145, at 47-49.
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fits of providing greater protection to student expressive activity more
than compensate for this opportunity cost."s
V. CONCLUSION
Courts will continue to find it necessary to balance competing
interests when students' speech activities collide with school authori-
ties' interest in maintaining an appropriate educational environment.
However, school officials should not be able to censor or ban student
speech simply because it occurs on school property or in connection
with a school event. First Amendment values are just as vital in the
classroom as they are in the schoolyard or on the street; the challenge
is striking a proper balance between student speech activities and
curricular integrity.
The deferential approach set forth in Hazelwood is a virtual abdi-
cation of the judicial obligation to protect the First Amendment rights
of students. A more refined approach is needed—an approach that
weighs the student's interest in a particular kind of speech against the
school's need to maintain good order and discipline. By restriking the
balance in favor of student speech activities under certain circum-
stances, a content-specific analysis ensures that students with serious
grievances against the school, or who wish to engage in robust debate
about the problems of the day, can do so during school hours.
A more content-specific approach would permit reviewing courts
to reconcile the conflict between a school's inculcation of commu-
nity values with the concern that school officials not cast "a pall of
orthodoxy" 174 over the school. If courts continue to apply the rational
basis test without further refinement, First Amendment freedoms—al-
though not shed at the schoolhouse gatel"—will be lost at the class-
room door.' 76
173 See id. at 15-19, 47-49.
174 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1967) (holding unconstitutional
a New York law requiring public employees, including college teachers, to sign loyalty statements).
05 Tinker v. Des Moines [ilet). Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
'Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Stipp. 687, 688-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
